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INTRODUCTION
Administrative agencies are hierarchical bureaucracies. But those on
the lower rungs don’t always fall lockstep in line with those at the top.
Reasons vary. Sometimes, intra-agency communication is poor. Those
laboring below may not know the preferences of their superiors. Even when
this information is available, sometimes bureaucrats are lazy; they can
“shirk.” Or they may simply disagree with what their bosses want; they
might “drift.” Each of these themes have been mainstays of principal-agent
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models across various disciplines. 1 Legal scholars too have studied
bureaucratic resistance, mainly of civil servants within the executive
branch. 2 These analyses have mostly endorsed career staff serving as a check
on executive overreach. 3
The Trump administration has renewed interest in the subject, 4 as many
perceived the traditional separation-of-powers to be in peril, especially in a
time of unified government. Trump’s rhetoric and choice of agency
appointees heightened the sense that political norms and institutions were at
risk. If the press couldn’t constrain a media-savvy President, many hoped,
perhaps a principled bureaucracy could. And like it or not, civil servants have
come out swinging. Some have reportedly created support groups to oppose
the Trump Administration and signed up for workshops on how to resist. 5
Others have filed complaints with inspectors general offices. 6 Career staff
have allegedly taken to social media to voice their opposition, whether in the
1. Public administration scholars, for example, have long questioned “bureaucratic
responsiveness.” See, e.g., Grace Hall Saltzstein, Bureaucratic Responsiveness: Conceptual Issues and
Current Research, 2 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 63 (1992). Implicit is the premise that many
bureaucrats are unresponsive, that is, their behavior does not change for newly-appointed agency heads.
Forget inertia—other social scientists have also analyzed the related phenomenon of “bureaucratic
autonomy,” the ways in which career staff can actively forge policy outcomes themselves. See, e.g.,
DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND
POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928 (2001).
2. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 4 (2006); Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule,
Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032 (2011); Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent
Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423 (2009); Jon D.
Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 541 (2015); Jon D.
Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old and New
Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227 (2016); Adam Shinar, Dissenting from Within: Why and
How Public Officials Resist the Law, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 601 (2013); Daniel E. Walters, LitigationFostered Bureaucratic Autonomy: Administrative Law Against Political Control, 18 J.L. & POL. 129
(2013). See also sources cited infra note 4.
3. See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 2; Michaels, supra note 2.
4. See, e.g., Josh Chafetz, Constitutional Maturity, or Reading Weber in the Age of Trump, 34
CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3314926
[https://perma.cc/66XQ-QJJ5]; Rebecca Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance and the National Security State,
104 IOWA L. REV. 139 (2018); Heidi Kitrosser, Accountability in the Deep State, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1532
(2018); Jon D. Michaels, The American Deep State, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1653 (2018); Keith A.
Petty, Duty and Disobedience: The Conflict of Conscience and Compliance in the Trump Era, 45 PEPP.
L. REV. 55 (2018).
5. Juliet Eilperin, Lisa Rein, & Marc Fisher, Resistance from within: Federal workers push back
against Trump, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/resistance-fromwithin-federal-workers-push-back-against-trump/2017/01/31/c65b110e-e7cb-11e6-b82f687d6e6a3e7c_story.html?utm_term=.4c64d45d2048 [https://perma.cc/BUG9-YAPV].
6. Id. (“At the Justice Department, an employee in the division that administers grants to
nonprofits fighting domestic violence and researching sex crimes said the office has been planning to
slow its work and to file complaints with the inspector general’s office if asked to shift grants away from
their mission.”).
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form of alternative Twitter accounts or more official channels. 7 Others have
drafted reports to reach conclusions contrary to those desired by policy
officials. 8
Bureaucratic resistance is hardly new—as evidenced by the decades of
scholarship studying it. Staffers at the Bureau of Land Management under
President Clinton, for example, confessed to leaking internal documents to
the media before any official policy announcements were made. 9 Careerists
at the Department of Agriculture reported to working-to-rule: doing what
was “technically required” but refusing to “advocate” for the food stamp
policies of President Reagan. 10 Indeed, the Reagan Administration also
encountered well-documented friction with enforcement officials at the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 11
What seems potentially novel in the Trump Administration, however,
is the extent to which that resistance is publicly defiant. 12 Instead of being
covert or channeled through official mechanisms, a greater degree of dissent
seems to have spilled out into the open by civil servants identified as such.
Bureaucrats seem to be increasingly opposing the President in their official
capacity. 13 And they are doing so despite strong agency norms to the
contrary. 14 The relative novelty of these dynamics is difficult, if not
impossible, to verify empirically. If correct, however, this development
7. Id. See also Why this U.S. civil servant runs a rogue Twitter account against Trump, CBC
RADIO (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/the-current-in-washington-april-27-20171.4086913/why-this-u-s-civil-servant-runs-a-rogue-twitter-account-against-trump-1.4086924 [https://
perma.cc/VT3V-3P3X].
8. Christopher Flavelle & Benjamin Bain, Washington Bureaucrats Are Quietly Working to
Undermine Trump’s Agenda, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/
2017-12-18/washington-bureaucrats-are-chipping-away-at-trump-s-agenda
[https://perma.cc/2APABYVV].
9. Emily Yehle, Tricky decision: Who gets a heads-up before a rollout?, E&E NEWS (Mar. 11,
2016), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060033867 [https://perma.cc/XK9R-U837].
10. MARISSA MARTINO GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATES BUREAUCRATS?: POLITICS AND
ADMINISTRATION DURING THE REAGAN YEARS 74–75 (2000); see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen & David
E. Pozen, Uncivil Obedience, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (2015).
11. See GOLDEN, supra note 10; JOEL A MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND
HARD CHOICES 40–83 (1995). See generally EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE
BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982).
12. Jennifer Nou, Taming the Shallow State, 36 YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Feb. 28,
2017),
http://yalejreg.com/nc/taming-the-shallow-state-by-jennifer-nou/ [https://perma.cc/N3VWMTCJ].
13. Coral Davenport, E.P.A. Workers Try to Block Pruitt in Show of Defiance, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/16/us/politics/scott-pruitt-environmental-protectionagency.html?mcubz=3 [http://perma.cc/9Z63-WU4G] (“[F]ormer E.P.A. officials said the open rebellion
by current employees was extraordinary . . . .”).
14. See Shinar, supra note 2, at 609 (noting that “official resistance” will sometimes manifest in
explicit refusal but will often take on more covert forms).
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suggests the heightened need to consider its implications in an administrative
state premised on hierarchy and political control. 15
This article is an initial exploration of the implications of civil servant
disobedience, a distinctly overt and communicative form of official protest. 16
The aim is not to advocate for disobedience—for the arguments against it are
very strong—but rather to examine principles for normatively evaluating the
practice. Elucidating them can very well lead one to determine that the
phenomenon is rarely, if ever, justified. In that spirit, the conclusions reached
here are tentative and likely to be revisited in future work. The hope is to
start, not end, more nuanced conversations—to move past simplistic
references to the “deep state” or “the resistance” towards a greater
appreciation of the complexity of intra-executive branch dynamics.
Civil servant disobedience, as defined here, refers to conscientious and
public acts of defiance against political appointees. Just as debates over civil
disobedience by private citizens arose in social context—the civil rights
movement, Vietnam War-era protests, assertions of religious liberty—so too
does the phenomenon of civil servant disobedience under the Trump
Administration. Indeed, it is worth briefly reflecting upon why this practice
has intensified of late. Civil servants have historically held a strong sense of
“role perception,” backed by powerful norms regarding appropriate
institutional behavior. 17 These norms have included respect for politicallyappointed superiors and the need to channel dissent through appropriate
internal channels. One defining characteristic of the Trump presidency,
however, has been its willingness to undermine long-held norms coupled
with its open hostility to the civil service. 18 Previous Presidents, to be sure,
15. See Paul Horwitz, What Will the Federal Government’s Resistance to President Trump Look
Like?, JOTWELL (Apr. 10, 2017), https://conlaw.jotwell.com/what-will-the-federal-governmentsresistance-to-president-trump-look-like/ [https://perma.cc/GRA8-U96N] (reviewing Daniel Correa, Civil
Dissent by Obedience and Disobedience: Exploiting the Gap Between Official Rules and Societal Norms
and Expectations, 8 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 219 (2016), and responding to Jessica Bulman-Pozen & David
E. Pozen, Uncivil Obedience, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (2015); Jennifer Nou, Bureaucratic Resistance
From Below, 36 YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Nov. 16, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/
bureaucratic-resistance-from-below-by-jennifer-nou/ [https://perma.cc/F324-Q4AC]; Nou, supra note
12).
16. It should be noted that the phrase “civil servant disobedience” is not entirely new to the legal
literature, but the concept has yet to be systematically specified or evaluated. See Alex Hemmer, Civil
Servant Suits, 124 YALE L.J. 758 (2014).
17. See, e.g., James P. Pfiffner, Political Appointees and Career Executives: The DemocracyBureaucracy Nexus in the Third Century, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 57 (1987) (“[C]areer civil servants are
motivated, at least in part, by their role perception, [which] leads them to cooperate with their appointed
principals in the executive branch.”).
18. See Josh Chafetz & David E. Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break Down, 65 UCLA L.
REV. 1430 (2018).
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have railed against what they perceived as a bloated federal bureaucracy.19
But the tone and rhetoric of this administration seems unprecedented. 20 Civil
servant disobedience may be the natural response.
Part I will introduce the concept of civil servant disobedience by
reference to the philosophical literature on civil disobedience by private
citizens. Civil servant disobedience will be defined as overt, good-faith acts
of protest by civil servants acting in their official capacity in violation of
executive directives. Part II will then evaluate the practice against various
conceptions of administrative democracy. It will introduce the ideal of
reciprocal hierarchy, according to which the views of civil servants are duly
considered by appointed agency heads. This ideal emphasizes not only topdown means of control, but also facilitates bottom-up concerns. When these
ideals are violated, normative space for legitimate civil servant disobedience
arguably arises. In this sense, the practice is valid when it is administrativeprocess-perfecting.
In addition, this Part also considers other necessary factors for civil
disobedience to be legitimate. They include the extent to which such
behavior arises under statutes that can be read to require consultation with
expert, career staff. In addition, such activity must also conform to
professional norms; be used only as a measure of last resort; and exhibit a
willingness to accept the legal consequences. Part III then takes a step back
to consider an alternative to civil servant disobedience—resignation—and
disobedience’s more dynamic effects. It concludes that the longer run harms
to the administrative state, including presidential backlash, must be seriously
balanced against the potential democratic benefits.

19. Throughout his presidency, Reagan laced his speeches with criticism of the bureaucracy. See,
e.g., Hedrick Smith, Reagan’s Effort to Change Course of Government, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 1984),
https://www.nytimes.com/1984/10/23/us/reagan-s-effort-to-change-course-of-government.html [https://
perma.cc/2S3R-VH2U] (quoting President Reagan’s famous declaration: “Government is not the solution
to our problem. Government is the problem”). Criticism of the civil service is not a single-party affair.
See, e.g., Clinton Takes Aim at Bureaucracy, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 11, 1993),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1993-02-11-9303177668-story.html [https://perma.cc/
3L8Q-BH3H] (describing President Clinton’s “giddy” announcement that he had “ordered a substantial
reduction in the federal work force and significant, year-by-year cuts in the administrative costs of each
department”).
20. See, e.g., Jon Michaels, How Trump is dismantling a pillar of the American state, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/07/donald-trumpdismantling-american-administrative-state [https://perma.cc/9WDC-X3VE]; Jonathan Lemire, Trump
White House Sees ‘Deep State’ behind Leaks, Opposition, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 14, 2017),
https://apnews.com/363ccdba946548bfa4b855ae38d1797a [https://perma.cc/6P2P-BWW6]; Eric Katz,
White House to ‘Career Bureaucrats’ Who Disagree with Trump: Get on Board or Get Out, GOV. EXEC.
(Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.govexec.com/management/2017/01/white-house-career-bureaucrats-whodisagree-trump-get-board-or-get-out/134997/ [https://perma.cc/7YVA-P3Y3].
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I. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
The first section briefly surveys various controversies regarding civil
disobedience by private citizens to help motivate thinking about their
bureaucratic analogues. 21 The next section then explores the strengths and
limits of the analogy and their implications.
A. By Private Citizens
Political philosophers have long contemplated the legitimacy of civil
disobedience as a social practice. 22 Perceived exemplars of the phenomenon
include Henry David Thoreau’s refusal to pay a poll tax, 23 the peaceful
marches of the civil rights movement, and anti-Vietnam War protests, to
name a few. The precise definition of civil disobedience remains contested,
but one classic formulation is that of “a public, non-violent, conscientious
yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about
a change in law or policies of government.” 24 Some features of this
definition—and the debates surrounding them—are worth briefly unpacking.
First, civil disobedience is often understood as nonviolent by contrast
to the more violent tactics associated with revolution or rebellion. In
addition, civil disobedience is widely agreed to be a communicative act, an
appeal to the public sphere. This aspect aligns with many intuitions about the
practice as a means of provoking dialogue 25 as well as to relay a message
otherwise unheard through existing political channels. For our purposes, the
phenomenon includes both traditional dissent as well as “dissenting by
deciding,” that is, dissenting through official action. 26 Understanding civil
disobedience with respect to its communicative intent helps to explain its
21. See Horwitz, supra note 15; Shinar, supra note 2 (comparing political disobedience by private
and public officials).
22. See, e.g., Hannah Arendt, Civil Disobedience, in CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 49, 51 (1972);
KIMBERLY BROWNLEE, CONSCIENCE AND CONVICTION: THE CASE FOR CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 17
(Timothy Endicott et al. eds., 2012); KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 29 (1987);
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 363 (1971); PETER SINGER, DEMOCRACY AND DISOBEDIENCE 2, 10
(1973); Hugo Adam Bedau, Civil Disobedience and Personal Responsibility for Injustice, in CIVIL
DISOBEDIENCE IN FOCUS 49 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1991); Jurgen Habermas, Civil Disobedience:
Litmus Test for the Democratic Constitutional State, 30 BERKELEY J. SOC. 95 (1985).
23. Stephen R. Alton, In the Wake of Thoreau: Four Modern Legal Philosophers and the Theory
of Nonviolent Civil Disobedience, 24 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 40–41 (1992).
24. RAWLS, supra note 22, at 364.
25. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter From Birmingham City Jail, in CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
IN FOCUS, supra note 22, at 68, 70–71.
26. Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1750 (2005) (“Dissenting
by deciding fuses the collective act with the public one, allowing electoral minorities to act collectively
at the same moment they act on behalf of the polity.”).
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nonviolent orientation, for violence would make it less likely for arguments
to be heard and seriously considered. 27
Civil disobedience is also often understood as conscientious, that is
“serious, sincere, and based on conviction.” 28 In other words, the civilly
disobedient do not act for strategic or merely self-serving reasons, but rather
act in good-faith. They genuinely believe in their stated ends. Put in Rawlsian
terms, civil disobedience must be framed in terms of public reasons even
though motivated by comprehensive doctrines. Thus, even if Martin Luther
King, Jr., was motivated by religious convictions, many of his actions could
be characterized as civil disobedience since they were also framed in terms
of political equality. 29
Accounts of civil disobedience also usually emphasize the role of
illegality. Unlawful acts can include both direct refusals to comply with the
laws under protest, as well as the violation of more minor laws as a means
of opposition. For example, civil disobedience can include the breaking of a
discriminatory law that is the object of dissent: The mayor of San Francisco
presided over gay and lesbian weddings in defiance of a law banning it,
invoking Letter from a Birmingham Jail in doing so. 30 Alternatively, civil
disobedience can also entail the breaking of a more minor trespass law when
entering the site of a nuclear power plant to protest it. 31
Predictably, legal scholars have been more attentive than philosophers
to the nuance and complications that arise when contemplating what “law”breaking entails in this context. 32 One legalist approach views “law” as only
those laws that are “clearly valid” and “without a colorable constitutional
claim” of invalidity. 33 In this view, law is “clearly valid” when the particular

27. RAWLS, supra note 22, at 366.
28. See Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 10. See also BROWNLEE, supra note 22.
29. RAWLS, supra note 22, at 365; Kimberley Brownlee, Civil Disobedience, in THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/civildisobedience [https://perma.cc/EH8U-EF63].
30. See Mayor defends same-sex marriages, CNN (Feb. 22, 2004), http://www.gavinnewsom.com/
index.php?id+47 [https://perma.cc/82UY-KWPF] (reprinting transcript of an interview with Gavin
Newsom invoking letter and themes of civil disobedience).
31. Brownlee, supra note 29; Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 10, at 823.
32. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Problem of the Compatibility of Civil Disobedience with
American Institutions of Government, 43 TEX. L. REV. 492 (1965); Archibald Cox, Direct Action, Civil
Disobedience, and the Constitution, in CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 2, 3 (1967);
ABE FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1968); Nicholas Katzenbach, Protest,
Politics and the First Amendment, 44 TUL. L. REV. 439 (1970); Burke Marshall, The Protest Movement
and the Law, 51 VA. L. REV. 785 (1965); Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 10, at 813.
33. Elliot Zashin, Civil Rights and Civil Disobedience: The Limits of Legalism, 52 TEX. L. REV.
285, 290 (1974).
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legal question has been adjudicated with finality by the Supreme Court.34
As such, the civil rights movement’s violation of state law was not
"law-breaking” because the Supreme Court ultimately vindicated
the constitutional arguments set forth by the movement’s proponents,
rendering the state laws unconstitutional.35 Many of the demonstrations
were thus not cases of civil disobedience (which requires
lawbreaking), but rather constitutionally-protected protest. A contrary
view provides that whether behavior constitutes political obedience
or not does not depend on subsequent court rulings; all that matters
is that “at the time of the violation there is a law or custom that a
government official stands ready to enforce against the protestor.” 36 In
other words, law-breaking occurs when an individual contravenes the
executive’s interpretation of the law, even if a court has yet to address it.
B. By Civil Servants
Civil disobedience by government employees raises a host of related,
albeit distinct, issues. Identifying a form of bureaucratic resistance akin to
civil disobedience is potentially fruitful for several reasons. First, both
phenomena raise the more general problem of overt political disobedience:
the question of when actors can openly defy duly elected or appointed
officials. Both also arise in contexts where rules—managerial or legal—
underlie a regime’s legitimacy. Flouting those rules presents a threat to the
governing order, whether a functional bureaucracy or a political democracy.
On the other hand, disobedience by public officials also raises many
issues distinct from that of private citizens, which may lead to diverging
normative conclusions. For example, unlike democratic citizens, civil
servants are subject to norms of hierarchical deference. They occupy
impersonal offices, from which they can resign. At the same time, civil
servants also possess specialized expertise and may have privileged access
to politically relevant information.
Before engaging in normative evaluation, it is first important to be more
precise about the discrete social practice at hand. While others have fruitfully
taxonomized varieties of bureaucratic resistance, 37 the aim here is just the
opposite: to isolate one increasingly prevalent form of resistance and subject

34. Cox, supra note 32.
35. See Zashin, supra note 33, at 289.
36. See Hugo Bedau, On Civil Disobedience, in OBLIGATION AND DISSENT (Donald W. Hanson
ed., 1971).
37. See e.g., Ingber, supra note 4; Shinar, supra note 2, at 630–45.
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it to scrutiny. Begin, then, with some potential examples of civil servant
disobedience:
•

Ten Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials openly
refused to implement a Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
directive deferring deportations of certain young, undocumented
immigrants. 38 The line officers argued that compliance would require
them to engage in illegal behavior that violated their oaths of office. 39
They then sued the head of DHS, who had been appointed by President
Obama. 40

•

Management at the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) directed the agency’s departmental records officer, Marcus
Smallwood, to compile documents related to a congressional request.
The request concerned alleged office decoration efforts by HUD
Secretary Ben Carson. Smallwood instead wrote an open letter to Carson
stating: “I do not have confidence that HUD can truthfully provide the
evidence . . . because there has been a concerted effort to stop email
traffic regarding these matters prior to August 1st.” 41 In other words, a
civil servant openly accused agency leadership of attempting to suppress
evidence.

•

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) employees engaged in public
protests against Trump’s then-new EPA Administrator, Scott Pruitt. 42
Some have remarked upon the “open rebellion” within the EPA more
generally. 43

38. The lead plaintiff was a then-current ICE agent and head of the ICE Agents and Officers Union.
His fellow plaintiffs were ICE agents stationed around the country. Crane v. Napolitano, 920 F. Supp. 2d
724 (N.D. Tex. 2013).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Juliet Eilperin, HUD to comply with congressional request on redecoration of Carson’s office,
WASH. POST (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/hud-to-comply-withcongressional-request-on-redecoration-of-carsons-office/2018/03/06/de229cb6-217d-11e8-86f654bfff693d2b_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ccc2a33ef64d [https://perma.cc/XZU3-WWE8].
42. Davenport, supra note 13. See Eric Katz, EPA Employees Vow to 'Stand Up! Fight Back!'
Against New Administration, Budget Cuts, GOV. EXEC. (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.govexec.com/
management/2017/03/epa-employees-protest-trump-pruitt-outside-agency-headquarters/136181/
[https://perma.cc/S4SR-YRZC]. See also Hundreds of current and former EPA employees protest
Trump’s nominee in Chicago, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 6, 2017, 5:32 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/local/breaking/ct-trump-epa-protest-chicago-20170206-story.html [https://perma.cc/9CE2-7T9W].
43. Davenport, supra note 13.
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As these examples suggest, civil servant disobedience involves
individuals acting in their official versus private capacities. 44 It is important
that the dissident, in other words, make clear that they are dissenting as a
civil servant, rather than as a private citizen. By contrast, objections raised
by employees after they have resigned are not acts of civil servant
disobedience; rather, they are simply engaged in political protest. Because
they have resigned, these individuals are no longer subject to the same
sanctions nor have as much at stake. 45
Civil servant disobedience must also be nonviolent and conscientious.
Resistance that is selfish and self-serving, by contrast, is better understood
as a form of insubordination. Of course, delineating the motives for one’s
actions is not always straightforward, but it is important to isolate acts made
in good-faith. Civil servant disobedience, again like its private counterpart,
should also be understood as communicative—an open effort to bring about
reform. Thus, the Department of Justice career lawyer that privately refuses
to work on a case with which she legally disagrees is not necessarily being
civilly disobedient. Such actions can serve as a form of private protest more
akin to what philosophers identify as conscientious objection. 46
Conscientious objection, unlike civil disobedience, is not carried out as an
effort at broader reform, but rather as a means of individual nonparticipation. 47 The aim is not political change, but preserving one’s sense
of personal integrity. Public dissent intended to spur social change, by
contrast, does constitute civil servant disobedience.
Overt, rather than covert, defiance is particularly notable here since
such behavior strays so far from the norms of “faceless” bureaucrats. Indeed,
resistance within administrative agencies is far more likely to fly under-theradar. 48 All the more important to understand the stakes when civil servants
openly defy the governing administration. Such defiance, even if open, can
take different forms. For example, one can engage in disobedience in one’s
own name—or else publicly, yet anonymously. Consider the Twitter
accounts that emerged after the Trump Administration imposed a so-called
44. See Shinar, supra note 2, at 606 (noting that “official resistance” is “by definition, not exercised
by private individuals”).
45. “Noisy resignations” that defy the usual norm of bureaucrats who exit quietly are likely to
warrant their own normative evaluation. See the more general discussion regarding resignation at Section
III.A.
46. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 277–86 (1979); Carl Cohen, Conscientious
Objection, 78 ETHICS 269 (July 1968).
47. Brownlee, supra note 29.
48. See Shinar, supra note 2, at 611 (observing that official “resistance will take on relatively covert
forms”).
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gag order prohibiting employees from speaking with the press. Civil servants
allegedly flouted the order by tweeting information about climate change and
other policies clashing with those of the administration. 49 Many of these
accounts explicitly identified themselves as operated from within the career
staff ranks. 50 Though their veracity remains uncertain, these accounts
constitute a form of public but anonymous political disobedience. The
disobedience is open, but the identity of the disobedient is unknown. Leaking
also has these characteristics. Insofar as some leaks involve legally
prohibited public disclosures by unidentified civil servants of confidential
government information, they too could be examples of anonymous yet open
disobedience.51
While public, yet anonymous, behavior shares many characteristics
with civil servant disobedience, it is useful to recognize it as a separate
phenomenon. Anonymity arguably fails to honor norms of public
deliberation between free and equal citizens. 52 It can also show insufficient
respect for the rule of law since anonymity protects the lawbreaker from
suffering the consequences of her actions. Anonymity also renders one’s
motives more suspect; it makes it more difficult to verify whether the act is
conscientious or self-serving. Relatedly, it is more difficult for others to
challenge the anonymous bureaucrat, thereby potentially limiting the
effectiveness and verifiability of the dissent’s substance. 53 Civil servant
disobedience, as understood here, will thus not include anonymous behavior
in its definition.
Another thorny dimension of isolating civil servant disobedience is
specifying what it means for bureaucrats to be engaged in unlawful behavior.
Lawbreaking, after all, is a critical component of civil disobedience. 54 For
49. Steve Gorman, Defying Trump, Twitter feeds for U.S. government scientists go rogue, REUTERS
(Jan.
25,
2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-resist-idUSKBN15A0DI
[https://perma.cc/2LA5-ES4H].
50. Mindy Weisberger, “Rogue” Science Agencies Defy Trump Administration on Twitter, SCI.
AM. (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ldquo-rogue-rdquo-science-agenciesdefy-trump-administration-on-twitter/ [https://perma.cc/7MFS-C52B].
51. See David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones
Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 521 (2013).
52. Cf. David Lefkowitz, On a Moral Right to Civil Disobedience, 117 ETHICS 202, 211 (2007)
(noting that “while anonymity is not strictly inconsistent with public disobedience, many observers may
feel some tension between such conduct and the importance to the disobedient agent of demonstrating to
her fellow citizens that she respects their equal moral claim to settle the form that morally necessary
collective action ought to take”).
53. See Frederick A. Elliston, Civil Disobedience and Whistleblowing: A Comparative Appraisal
of Two Forms of Dissent, 1 J. BUS. ETHICS 23 (1982).
54. Other forms of bureaucratic resistance, by contrast, can be understood analogously to what
Jessica Bulman-Pozen and David Pozen refer to as “uncivil obedience,” which “requires that authoritative
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government employees, the most salient binding directives come from
within the executive branch itself. 55 As such, a government employee can be
understood to engage in civil servant disobedience when she flouts an
executive directive, whether in the form of a presidential order or an agency
head edict.
On this front, Gillian Metzger and Kevin Stack advance the important
position that such forms of intra-executive branch documents indeed
constitute forms of law. 56 Specifically, Metzger and Stack define the
category broadly to include “measures generated by agencies” as well as
higher-level executive officials “to control their own actions and operations
and aimed primarily at agency personnel.” 57 These pronouncements
constitute law because they provide “at least a presumptively overriding (or
presumptively primary) reason for action.” 58 In other words, civil servants
generally feel “bound” to follow them, regardless of their perceived merit. 59
Understood accordingly, violations of internal agency directives are thus
sufficient to constitute an act of civil servant disobedience, as defined here.
Civil servant disobedience, in other words, occurs when a government
employee flouts an internal agency or executive branch directive as a
conscientious means of reform-minded protest. 60
directives be followed rather than flouted, obeyed rather than disobeyed.” See Bulman-Pozen & Pozen,
supra note 10, at 824 (observing behavior in context of administrative agencies).
55. One could also conceive of such disobedience arising as a response to actors external to the
executive branch, such as a court. For example, a Customs and Border Patrol agent that reportedly
continued to deport those from identified countries after the travel ban was enjoined by a court could be
understood to be engaged in civil servant disobedience. See Betsy Woodruff, Feds Blow Off Judge and
Congressmen to Enforce Trump’s Order at Dulles, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 30, 2017),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/feds-blow-off-judge-and-congressmen-to-enforce-trumps-orders-atdulles [https://perma.cc/8TKN-JDEU]. The defiance of judicial as opposed to executive orders, however,
raises a host of distinct issues such as the premises of judicial supremacy that must be addressed another
day. For related discussion, see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 991 (2008).
56. See Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L. REV.
1239, 1244 (2017) (arguing “that many internal measures, ranging from substantive guidelines to
management structures that allow for oversight of agency operations, qualify as forms of law”).
57. Id. at 1254.
58. Id. at 1257.
59. Id.
60. For those that reject this conception of law in favor of a more recognizable form, it is
worthwhile noting that “political activity” by federally-funded employee while acting in an official
capacity violates the positive law of the Hatch Act as well. Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321–7326 (2012).
See U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL, THE HATCH ACT: PERMITTED AND PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES FOR
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES SUBJECT TO FURTHER RESTRICTIONS (Feb. 2016), https://osc.gov/Resources/
HA%20Poster%20Further%20Restricted%202016.pdf [https://perma.cc/MP59-PZQC]. The Act was
passed in 1939 to promote the nonpartisan administration of federal programs and to ensure merit-based
advancement. Id. Its prohibitions are broad: political activity refers to “an activity directed towards the
success or failure of a political party, candidate for partisan office or partisan political group.” 5 C.F.R. §
734.101 (2018). Thus, many perceived acts of civil servant disobedience may be categorized as potential
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Finally, it is also useful to distinguish civil servant disobedience from
what some philosophers have identified as “rule departures” by public
officials. 61 On one view, a rule departure is “the deliberate decision by an
official, for conscientious reasons, not to discharge the duties of her
office.” 62 Examples include when police choose not to arrest an offender, or
a decision by jury or judge to acquit an obviously guilty individual. 63 Some
commenters argue that rule departure, unlike civil disobedience, does not
require a breach of law and, as such, does not expose the dissenter to
punishment. 64 While these concepts are matters of definition, rule departers
appear to broadly cover both politically-appointed principals and agents:
those with high-level discretion such as prosecutors and judges as well as
line-officials such as police. 65
By comparison, civil servant disobedience is uniquely concerned with
those at the lowest levels of government hierarchy, and within administrative
agencies in particular. In a sense, then, perhaps civil servant disobedience is
a subset of rule departure. These refinements require a further note or two
about civil servants as a category. In practice, the delineation is a nuanced
one, 66 but for our purposes civil servants consist of those federal employees
that undergo a merit-based hiring and selection process 67 and are only
removable “for cause.” 68 They are not political appointees that cycle through
government office, but rather remain through multiple administrations.

violations of the Hatch Act, thereby raising the question of whether and when such illegal behavior can
be justified.
61. Brownlee, supra note 29.
62. Id.
63. Id. (citing Joel Feinberg, Civil Disobedience in the Modern World, in 2 HUMANITIES IN
SOCIETY 37 (1979)).
64. Id.
65. For this reason, rule departures are also similar to what Adam Shinar deems “official
resistance.” See Shinar, supra note 2, at 606. In Shinar’s account, “official resistance can only be practiced
by public officials, which can include “elected officials, but it also encompasses nonelected officials,
most notably administrators and members of the bureaucracy.” Id.
66. Indeed, the federal civil service consists of three categories: the merit-based competitive
service, the Senior Executive Service (SES), and those who are “excepted” from merit-based restrictions.
See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. CAL. L. REV.
913, 925–26 (2009). Of these categories, the first two consist almost entirely of career employees (the
“almost” is because the SES “contains career employees as well as political officials, but political
appointees can make up no more than 10 percent of the whole SES (or one-quarter of the SES slots in
any one agency).” Id.
67. 5 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(1) (2012).
68. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7513(a), 7521(a)–(b) (2012); 5 U.S.C. § 4303 (2012). See Jason Marisam, The
President’s Agency Selection Powers, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 821, 863 (2013).
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These characteristics, as we shall see, are important because of the distinct
role that civil servants play in democratic administration. 69
II. EVALUATING CIVIL SERVANT DISOBEDIENCE
Just as accounts of civil disobedience ground themselves in an ideal
conception of the polity, so too must those of civil servant disobedience. It
is difficult to evaluate the practice, in other words, without a sense of the
higher order principles at stake to guide the inquiry. Indeed, a major theme
in the study of private civil disobedience has been its compatibility (or lack
thereof) with a particular conception of liberal democracy. 70 To simplify this
rich set of views, constitutional democracies rely on elected institutions for
legitimacy subject to judicial review. Thus, the laws duly passed by
legislatures, signed by the President, and affirmed by courts warrant
obedience.
Civil disobedience, however, poses a destabilizing threat. Nevertheless,
the liberal defense of civil disobedience posits that higher principles of free
and equal citizenship impose limits on democratic authority. When
majorities threaten minority rights, for example, civil disobedience is
merited. In this view, such resistance is justified when democracies
jeopardize the equal worth and basic liberties of their citizens. 71
Might there be an analogous higher order conception of democratic
bureaucracy to help guide the conditions, if any, under which civil servant
disobedience is appropriate? Are there any principles one might look to in
order to normatively evaluate when departures from those principles may
justify behavior that might otherwise be prohibited? The first section
explores this question, while the following sections focus on justificatory
limitations on civil servant disobedience that result.

69. Within this category, there is also much variation worthy of further refinement in future work;
some of the potential themes will only be alluded to here. For instance, it is likely that one may think
differently about the normative obligations of lawyers versus government scientists versus policy
analysts.
70. This liberal tradition is often associated with John Rawls and Jeremy Waldron, among others.
RAWLS, supra note 22, at 363; Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153 (Jeremy
Waldron ed., 1984).
71. See Daniel Markovits, Democratic Disobedience, 114 YALE L.J. 1897, 1899 (2005)
(“Importantly, political disobedience, on this liberal account, may properly be directed against even
democratic laws and policies, because liberalism imposes limits on the authority even of democratic
governments.”).
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A. Internal Process-Perfection
One natural starting point for a conception of the ideal bureaucracy
might be found in the broader debate about how to justify the role of agencies
in democratic societies. After all, civil servant disobedience heightens
administrative law’s already considerable anxieties. As agencies exercise
power over private rights and liberties, scholars continue to search for ways
in which to justify that coercion by unelected actors—when that power is
exercised by those that lack a political appointment as well, the stakes rise.
The focus of the most prominent efforts to legitimate the administrative
state thus far tend to emphasize what might be described as external, publicfacing justifications: how the ways in which agencies interact with the public
accord with various conceptions of democracy. Perhaps less appreciated is
what these accounts have to say about an agency’s internal operations. In
what ways should organizational decision-making be structured to achieve
the external results contemplated in ideal bureaucracies?
Strikingly, a close reading of the relevant scholarship reveals a
conception of internal ordering which may help to vindicate different
external justifications for the administrative state. Call it the reciprocal
hierarchy of well-functioning bureaucracies. Hierarchies not only facilitate
top-down control, but also bottom-up information-sharing. When this ideal
is under siege, there is arguably space for legitimate civil servant
disobedience, provided that other conditions are also met, as later discussed.
In other words, when political appointees refuse to recognize the reciprocal
nature of hierarchy, they delegitimize the role of bureaucracies in a
democracy.
Take the civic republican concept of democracy, which privileges the
role of deliberation between free and equal citizens. This model rejects the
notion that government should “divide political spoils according to the prepolitical preferences of interest groups,” and instead calls upon citizens to
reconsider their preferences as they deliberate about the common good. 72 On
Mark Seidenfeld’s well-known account, 73 the administrative state is justified
as the institution best situated to vindicate this vision. In particular,
Seidenfeld emphasizes the “pyramidal structure of agencies.” 74 In his view,
civil servants adhere to a “professional ethic” that facilitates outside
participation and deliberation about matters that transcend pure politics. The
72. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 1511, 1514 (1992).
73. Id. at 1576.
74. Id. at 1559.
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organization of agencies into divisions also creates more points of access for
outside interest groups. 75 Most importantly, “[a]gency staff also can carry
credible interest group concerns to the upper echelons of the agency and can
carry agency responses back to the interest groups.” 76 In other words, a
hierarchy that conveys citizen concerns up the chain to political leadership
best serves the ideals of civic republicanism. 77 This reciprocal relationship
between staff and appointees, that is, facilitates informed deliberation within
and outside the agency.
Pluralist accounts of the administrative state similarly recognize the
centrality of civil servants. 78 In the pluralist view, agencies allow selfinterested bargaining between interest groups in the face of broad
congressional delegations. 79 One strand of the pluralist view thus
understands regulations as the means through which to distribute benefits
and burdens. Another vein views interest-group competition as the optimal
means of advancing the public interest through free-market-like
mechanisms. 80 In each of these accounts, civil servants can facilitate
bargaining between divergent interests as well as agency leadership. As the
main points of contact between these outside groups and more transient
appointees, staff can play an important role in facilitating the political
market.
Yet another prominent justification for administrative agencies is their
superior expertise relative to other policymaking bodies. 81 Expertise-based
models rely on the specialized training and professionalism of civil servants
to legitimate administrative power. A related view privileges the reign of
“comprehensive rationality,” as exemplified by cost-benefit analysis and
similar attempts to rationalize the policymaking process. 82 As the main
practitioners of these methods, agency staff thus play an integral role.
Agencies, in other words, must depend heavily on the civil service to satisfy
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in A Deliberative Model of the Administrative State,
81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1445 (2013) (“[A]gency staff—interacting with the public and others in
the executive branch in a non-political manner—can serve as republican guardians of regulatory action,
and that the aim of the administrative state should be to foster deliberation and consensus among staff
members responsible for agency rulemaking.”).
78. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667, 1808–10 (1975).
79. Id.
80. See Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335,
343–56 (1974).
81. See Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative
Agency Decision Making, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 196–97 (1997) (calling these models “expertocratic”).
82. Id. (citing Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV.
393, 396 (1981)).
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the requirements of arbitrary-or-capricious review. These expert-driven
concerns, in turn, must be funneled up the agency hierarchy in order to
inform actual decisionmaking.
In this manner, different democratic justifications for the administrative
state all recognize the role of civil servants in facilitating internal
deliberation, interest-group access and expertise. Equally importantly, they
celebrate the staff’s ability to bring this learning and information to the
agency’s upper echelons. The idea of a reciprocal hierarchy is paramount.
To review, the civic republican emphasis on deliberation depends heavily on
a back-and-forth between career staff and appointees to vindicate its vision.
The pluralist account similarly requires a pathway from civil servants and
interest groups to political decisionmakers within the agency. Expert-driven
justifications too require channels for information and data to help inform
final decisionmaking.
The ideal of a reciprocal hierarchy, then, is core to any conception of
democratic administration. Legitimate bureaucracies, in other words, must
contain both mechanisms of authoritarian internal control—to facilitate
accountability—as well as bottom-up information flow to incorporate
deliberation, interest-group participation, or expertise. Indeed, this ideal is
currently instantiated in practice through a number of mechanisms. Perhaps
the clearest example is the presence of formalized clearance procedures in
most, if not all, agencies. These processes require different offices and
interests within an agency to review various agency actions before presented
to the agency head for final sign-off. 83 In this manner, agency heads have a
robust means of aggregating information and views within the agency.
When these channels of bottom-up information-sharing are blocked or
otherwise impeded, however, the legitimacy of the bureaucracy falters on
any account of democratic administration. Without a way for agency
officials to access the opinions of career staff, in other words, these officials
83. To illustrate, when it comes to draft regulations, rule drafters within the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) must secure the approval of a branch reviewer; the Associate, Deputy, and Chief Counsels;
the Assistant to the Commissioner; and, finally, the Commissioner before moving on to the Department
of Treasury for final authorization. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL
§ 32.1.6.8.4
(2018),
https://www.irs.gov/irm/part32/irm_32-001-006#idm139647508295712
[https://perma.cc/WUF7-WULZ]. Generally speaking, those in these clearance chains do not possess hard
internal vetoes in the sense that they can unilaterally stop the rulemaking from proceeding. See Margo
Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence Without Authority in Federal Agencies, 36 CARDOZO L. REV.
53, 94 (2014) (“[O]ne government office ordinarily cannot authoritatively stop the issuance of a document
by its sibling office.”). However, they can delay the draft rules by raising objections during the sign-off
process. Id. (“[I]t is possible to give an office assigned a clearance role something very close to that
power, by structuring the conflict resolution procedure so that it is the operational office that needs to
‘appeal’ a clearance denial.”).
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are unable to take into account expert perspectives or those of long-standing
interests. This bureaucratic ideal is also consistent with what Max Weber
famously called bureaucracy’s “rational-legal” claims to legitimacy. 84 In
Weber’s view, bureaucracies relied on lawlike rules that granted relative
amounts of power to impersonal offices and structured their interactions
accordingly. In this sense, “[o]bedience is owed to the legally established
impersonal order.” 85 This system of ordering is rationalized insofar as it
depends on regularized rules and procedures to advance non-arbitrary
action. 86 Importantly, Weber’s ideal bureaucracy also privileged technical
expertise. 87
To be clear, the claim here is not that appointees must adopt the views
of civil servants—they can (and often should) reject them altogether; rather,
it is simply that consideration is due for administrative decision-making to
be legitimate. Under these circumstances, when internal channels of
deliberation are unavailable, there is more normative space to appeal directly
to external political channels through civil servant disobedience. In this
sense, the social practice can be understood as a form of bureaucratic
process-perfection.
In considering this argument, it is useful to note its parallel with
accounts of civil disobedience by private citizens. Daniel Markovits, for
instance, argues that civil disobedience is justified as a means of unblocking
political channels of protest, what he calls “democratic disobedience.” 88 In
his civic republican view, lawbreaking protest is essential to foster a thicker
conception of active democratic engagement. Unlike the liberal narrative, his
republican account aims to bolster democracy on its own terms, rather than
as an appeal to an external set of higher principles for legitimation.
Analogously, process-perfecting civil servant disobedience appeals to
internal mechanisms within agencies themselves to help vindicate their
democratic pedigree. By ensuring that administrative hierarchies are
reciprocal, that is, civil servant disobedience may help to legitimate agency
action.
Against this backdrop, consider numerous reports that the Trump
Administration has violated the ideals of reciprocal hierarchy. Specifically,
84. MAX WEBER ET AL., THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 328 (1947).
85. See Helen Constas, Max Weber’s Two Conceptions of Bureaucracy, 63 AM. J. SOC. 400, 401
(1958).
86. Id. See also Shinar, supra note 2, at 622; William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class
in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198, 1225 (1983).
87. See WEBER ET AL., supra note 84.
88. Markovits, supra note 71, at 1949.
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many agency heads have simply sidelined federal employees by not
consulting them on important policy matters, and cutting them out of the
decision-making process altogether. This appears to be most severe in the
State Department 89 but is also reported in the Department of Veterans
Affairs 90 and Environmental Protection Agency. 91 At the State Department,
for example, then-Secretary Rex Tillerson apparently announced a so-called
“FOIA Surge” to process a backlog of Freedom of Information Act requests.
In order to do this, “prominent Ambassadors and specialized civil servants”
were assigned to this rudimentary work, many of whom had worked on high
priority issues under the Obama Administration. 92 Similarly, former
Department of Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke reportedly “ordered the
involuntary reassignment of dozens of the department’s most senior civil
servants.” 93 Under these circumstances, the legitimacy of administrative
action is imperiled.
B. Further Conditions
At the same time, the reciprocal hierarchy is not without boundaries.
That is, the lower ranks do not need to be consulted unless the relevant
authorizing statutes demand expertise and information that civil servants
uniquely possess. Evidence of such demand can often be found in the internal
clearance processes described earlier. For example, a statute mandating the
“best available technology” usually requires input from agency engineers
and professionals. 94 The EPA, for example, has an extensive technical
clearance process for internal scientific reports to inform regulations issued

89. See Julia Ioffe, The State of Trump’s State Department, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 2017), https:/
/www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/03/state-department-trump/517965/ [https://perma.cc/
28G7-2RJB] (describing State Department employees as “adrift and listless” and noting that they are shut
out of meetings with foreign leaders and not consulted for policy advice).
90. Lisa Rein, Exodus from Trump’s VA: When the mission of caring for veterans ‘is no longer a
reason for people to stay’, WASH. POST (May 3, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/whowants-to-work-there-now-trumps-ronny-jackson-fiasco-may-be-the-least-of-vas-worries/2018/05/02/
e1c64af0-44cf-11e8-8569-26fda6b404c7_story.html?utm_term=.e6d68712ad4e
[https://perma.cc/
2XPZ-M7MF] (reporting on an “exodus” where about forty senior staffers have left the agency since the
beginning of the year, with most citing being sidelined as major reasons for departure).
91. Jeff Tollefson, Science under siege: behind the scenes at Trump’s troubled environment
agency, NATURE (July 12, 2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-05706-9 [https://
perma.cc/6FQA-VJDM] (noting that “Pruitt and his senior political appointees . . . rarely consult with
career scientists,” increase “the risk of weakening the EPA’s defence in the many lawsuits that states and
environmental groups were filing against the agency”).
92. Id.
93. Id. See Kitrosser, supra note 4.
94. See Magill & Vermeule, supra note 2.
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under such statutes. 95 If an EPA Administrator disregarded or doctored the
results of such process, then the agency scientist may be more justified in
defying orders not to make such reports public, as further discussed below.
By contrast, agency staff would not be justified in openly flouting
directives under statutes that clearly afford political appointees unreviewable
discretion. Of course, the lines between so-called political and expert
determinations are famously contested, 96 but the exercise here is one of
identifying the relevant underlying principles. 97 The general idea behind this
condition is to recognize the duly circumscribed role for civil servants in the
policymaking process. Put differently, the ideal of a reciprocal hierarchy
privileges bureaucratic deliberation as legislatively authorized.
While a violation of the reciprocal hierarchy provides a basis for
disobedience, it is not a sufficient one. There are also other important
conditions to consider when assessing whether any particular instance of
civil servant disobedience is justified. These conditions exhibit civil servant
disobedience’s fidelity to law, despite its law-breaking premise. Uniting
them, in other words, is their “constraining commitment to state authority,” 98
despite the necessity of challenging it to ultimately vindicate higher
principles. Indeed, "[a]t the heart of most every conception of civil
disobedience . . . is the paradox of law-breaking that is, at the same time,
law-respecting.” 99 Civil servants may sometimes have to break the law to
ultimately preserve its legitimacy.
Accordingly, civil servant disobedience should be a measure of last
resort. This condition draws upon a robust debate about the extent to which
private civil disobedience must fulfill this condition as well as what that
requirement means in practice. One view holds that democratic citizens have
an obligation to follow the law to the extent possible, including using the
appropriate legal channels of dissent before resorting to illegal ones. 100 Only
after attempts to pursue lawful means have failed does the potential
legitimacy of civil disobedience arise. Analogously, it is important not only
to the rule of law, but also to the ideal of hierarchical reciprocity that career

95. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BEST PRACTICES FOR CLEARANCE OF SCIENTIFIC PRODUCTS AT
EPA (May 2018), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-05/documents/best_practices_for_
clearance_of_scientific_products_at_epa_final_21may2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQH8-QJVJ].
96. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
BUREAUCRACY 91 (1990) (discussing why “politics” and “science” are “conceptually problematic”
categories).
97. See infra Section III.A.
98. See Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 10, at 814.
99. Id.
100. RAWLS, supra note 22, at 373.
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staff abide by what measures already exist to express dissent or protest before
engaging in public disobedience.
These measures include channels not only within the agency, but also
the executive branch more broadly. First, within the agency, civil servants
should elevate the matter to a higher-level appointee. Doing so fulfills the
ideal of a reciprocal hierarchy insofar as the relevant information is now
being shared with someone who possesses higher-level decision-making
authority. This condition also coheres with various guidelines regarding
legal and scientific ethics. The model rules of professional conduct for
lawyers, for example, state that government lawyers observing illegal
conduct may “refer the matter to higher authority in the organization” as long
as doing so is in the best interests of the organization. 101 Agency-specific
scientific integrity policies also stress that scientific disagreements “be
resolved during internal deliberations” or “peer review” when available. 102
The EPA’s scientific integrity policy, for instance, identifies an internal
reporting mechanism to the agency’s own Scientific Integrity Official,
Deputy Scientific Integrity Officials, or the Office of Inspector General. 103
Indeed, Inspectors General (IGs) currently exist by statute in about
seventy-two executive agencies. 104 Their stated purpose “is to create
independent and objective units within each agency whose duty it is to
combat waste, fraud, and abuse in the programs and operations of that
agency.” 105 While they are removable at will, they enjoy heightened
procedural protections and operate under norms of independence. 106 Each IG
is also authorized to receive whistleblower complaints from agency
employees and must strive to preserve anonymity when possible. 107 Through
investigations and audits, IGs then prepare public reports for Congress and
agency heads reporting their findings.
When reporting misconduct or illegality, civil servants also have other
avenues to make the behavior known. For example, they could approach the
Office of Special Counsel and expect confidentiality. While OSC does not
101. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(b) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2016). See also Adam J.
White, Ethics in the Executive Branch: The Constitutional Need to Preserve Presidential Energy, 22 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 257, 260. (2017).
102. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY POLICY (2012), https://www.epa.gov/
sites/production/files/2014-02/documents/scientific_integrity_policy_2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
5PWN-PD92].
103. Id.
104. COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GEN. ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY, THE INSPECTORS
GENERAL (July 14, 2014), https://ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/IG_Authorities_Paper_-_Final_6-1114.pdf [https://perma.cc/M349-CM83].
105. Id.
106. Id. at 9.
107. Id.
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have investigative authority, it could order an agency to investigate the claim
and submit a report on the reasonableness of that investigation to Congress
and the President. Should the employee suffer retaliation, there are also
various processes available, which can involve OSC and/or the Merit
Systems Protection Board, or else a union-protected grievance procedure
usually involving private arbitrators.
Given these alternative channels of dissenting in pursuit of potential
reform, it is only when these channels have been exhausted or are otherwise
compromised that normative space for civil servant disobedience potentially
exists. Some in the civil disobedience context argue that the condition of last
resort is a necessary one, though others regard it only as a presumption.108
Some also recognize that the condition need not be absolute nor impractical:
“[I]f past actions have shown the majority immovable or apathetic, further
attempts many reasonably be thought fruitless.” 109 In other words, potential
dissidents need not continue appealing hopelessly to those in power before
considering civil disobedience. The same holds true in the civil servant
context: If intra-executive branch appeals are pointless or ignored, then civil
servant disobedience becomes more valid.
Relevantly, the Trump Administration has currently left many highlevel political appointments vacant. So too with IG positions at many highprofile agencies, including the Department of Defense, Department of
Interior, Environmental Protection Agency, and Central Intelligence
Agency. 110 The Merit Systems Protection Board has lacked a quorum for the
longest period in its history. As institutionalized channels of dissent become
less available, the more appeals to the external political precess may be
justified.
Relatedly, when civil servants resort to disobedience, they must also do
so in ways that accord with the professional norms at the core of bureaucratic
legitimacy. Professionals like scientists, policy analysts, and lawyers are
governed by independent, expert-driven norms into which they have been
socialized and educated. 111 These norms, in turn, are often sustained through
peer review and professional association. Indeed, as discussed above,
professional expertise has often been invoked as an independent justification
108. RAWLS, supra note 22, at 373.
109. Id.
110. See Tracking how many key positions Trump has filled so far, WASH. POST, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-administration-appointee-tracker/database/
?utm_term=.fa6edc95d809 [https://perma.cc/KL3J-ZELR].
111. Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the Administrative Presidency: Turning
Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 592–93 (2011).
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for the administrative state. 112 Thus, civil servant disobedience with little
connection to subject-specific training is illegitimate. For example, some
Department of Labor (DOL) employees wrote a public letter to protest
appointee Andrew Puzder based on his prior business practices and
perceived lack of respect for low-wage workers and women. 113 Many rightly
perceived a violation of merit principles, however, given that the grounds for
criticism were not clearly connected to any specialized perspective offered
by DOL civil servants. 114
Finally, civil servants who disobey must be willing to accept the legal
consequences of their actions. 115 The willingness to do so helps to establish
the behavior as credibly sincere and conscientious. In addition, acquiescence
to punishment demonstrates one’s overall commitment to the rule of law.
Instead of being perceived as a mere gadfly, a readiness to submit to legal
punishment expresses one’s respect for stability and legal ordering. It can
also make those in power realize the magnitude of the stakes involved—what
for them may have been a minor issue takes on a greater significance once
people go to jail or are otherwise punished for it. 116
Given the Supreme Court’s governing precedents, note that it is
unlikely that civil servant disobedience is protected by the First Amendment
in most instances. 117 While government employees do not relinquish all of
their First Amendment rights at the agency’s door, 118 the Court has made
clear that the government has broad powers to restrict employee speech. 119
The government has an important interest in managing an efficient and
orderly workplace. That interest, however, can be narrowly balanced against
an employee’s right to speak out on matters of “public concern.” 120 What
112. See, e.g., J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23–24 (1938).
113. See Joe Davidson, Labor Dept. employees urge vote against Puzder nomination, WASH POST.
(Feb.
14,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/02/14/labor-deptemployees-urge-vote-against-puzder-nomination/?utm_term=.2c0d0690af75 [https://perma.cc/2WJH9DPB] (noting that the letter stated that “three specific factors disqualify Mr. Puzder from serving as the
head of an agency whose primary mission is to protect America’s workforce: (1) Mr. Puzder’s own
business practices; (2) his derisive public comments about his restaurants’ employees and other low-wage
workers; and (3) his equally troubling public comments and behavior towards women”).
114. See Michael Wald, Labor Department Employees Urge Vote Against Puzder
Nomination . . . But Should They?, FEDSMITH (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.fedsmith.com/2017/02/15/
labor-department-employees-urge-vote-against-puzder-nomination-but-should-they [https://perma.cc/
2MBS-QZX6].
115. RAWLS, supra note 22, at 366; Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 10, at 817.
116. SINGER, supra note 22, at 84.
117. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Whistleblowing Speech and the First Amendment, 93 IND. L.J.
267, 286 (2018).
118. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1967).
119. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671–72 (1994) (plurality opinion).
120. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
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constitutes a matter of public concern is, however, “not well defined” 121 with
courts looking to the “content, form, and context of a given statement, as
revealed by the whole record,” in order to determine when it is implicated. 122
Even when government employee speech relates to a matter of public
concern, the Court has also held that First Amendment protection does not
extend to speech made in the course of work-related duties. 123 The Garcetti
Court explained that “[a] government entity has broader discretion to restrict
speech when it acts in its role as employer, but the restrictions it imposes
must be directed at speech that has some potential to affect the entity’s
operations.” 124 In other words, even if an employee speaks on public matters,
if the speech is work-related, the speech is not constitutionally protected. All
in all, “the contemporary Supreme Court has limited quite significantly the
constitutional protections available to government employees who wish to
call attention to misconduct or inefficiency in government operations.” 125
Because civil servant disobedience must be expressed in an official capacity
by definition, it is therefore unlikely to enjoy First Amendment protection
under existing precedents.
***
To summarize thus far, legitimate civil servant disobedience may arise
when the conditions of reciprocal hierarchy have been violated under statutes
that can be read to require the information civil servants are uniquely situated
to provide. Such disobedience is only legitimate when it adheres to
professional norms, is used as a measure of last resort, and is exercised in
contemplation of the legal consequences. Many of these principles are
undoubtedly not straightforward in application; again, the project here has
been to identify the relevant evaluative factors. These normative limitations
may actually mean that very little civil servant disobedience is justified in
practice.

121. San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011). See
also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985).
122. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983). In Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 380
(1987), the Court applied this standard and found that a comment (“if they go for him again, I hope they
get him”) made by a clerical employee in a constable’s office about the attempted assassination of the
President of the United States implicated a matter of public concern as it was made in the course of a
conversation regarding the policies of the President.
123. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
124. Id.
125. Krotoszynski, Jr., supra note 117.
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C. Grounds for Disobedience
Now for perhaps the hardest question, one that most requires further
debate after the initial exploration here: on what substantive basis is civil
servant disobedience legitimate? The ideal of a reciprocal hierarchy suggests
procedural conditions that, when violated, may justify defiance. The ideal
recognizes the importance of internal bureaucratic deliberation of the kind
contemplated by authorizing statutes and agency procedures established
accordingly.
But
what
are
the
substantive
grounds
for
legitimate disobedience? In other words, on what basis is it appropriate for
civil servants to resist?
These questions underscore the stakes involved. On the one hand,
agency heads are the most politically accountable actors at the agency,
especially if they are removable at will. They are usually appointed by the
President who has the constitutional duty to “take care” that the laws are
“faithfully executed,” 126 and confirmed by the Senate. 127 Agency heads, not
career staff, are delegated authority, by Congress. 128 Civil servants, by
contrast, are unelected. Some empirical evidence suggests they have liberal
tendencies as a group, though their preferences vary by agency. 129 Allowing
for disobedience may result in misplaced ideological tensions in the guise of
principled action. Furthermore, once an agency head has made a final
decision, obedience is necessary to ensure efficient and effective action.
Open disobedience, by contrast, threatens disruption and distraction.
On the other hand, agency heads can make decisions that violate
scientific integrity, the law, or morality. 130 Many of these choices can be
easily shielded from public scrutiny. Civil servants, however, are wellplaced to know of these potential deficiencies. The question of disobedience,
then, raises difficult tensions: between managerial imperative and legitimate
bureaucratic action; between efficient agency functioning and constrained
governmental power. Normative conclusions about how to resolve these
tensions must balance these competing concerns.

126. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
127. Id. § 2.
128. See Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 263, 277, 284–91 (2006) (discussing “ simple delegations,” “delegations to executive officials”).
129. David E. Lewis, “Deep State” Claims and Professional Government, REG. REV. (Dec. 5, 2017),
https://www.theregreview.org/2017/12/05/lewis-deep-state-professional-government/ [https://perma.cc/
L6L6-UQG3].
130. Of course, the distinctions between some of these categories are deeply contested, as later
discussed. See infra notes 156–162 and accompanying text.
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One way to do so may be to permit internal defiance only when an
executive violation of some relevant value—such as scientific integrity,
legality or morality—is “clear.” Allowing disobedience from clear breaches
of the relevant principles may reduce the risk of erroneous agency disruption,
while at the same time vindicating values for which there is a broad social
consensus. To be sure, there is enormous criticism about how to apply this
criterion—clarity—in practice. 131 But it is worth observing that the criterion
already forms the basis for many justificatory accounts of related social
practices.
Take, for example, debates over military disobedience—the question of
when members of the armed forces can or should refuse to comply with a
direct order. 132 The military, even more so than the bureaucracy, demands
obedience and expedient execution. In the Supreme Court’s words, the
“army is not a deliberative body,” but rather “the executive arm. . . . Vigor
and efficiency on the part of the officer and confidence among the soldiers
in one another are impaired if any question be left open as to their attitude to
each other.” 133 Military obedience, much more so than in the bureaucracy,
can mean the difference between life or death.
Even in this context, however, soldiers are not expected to obey all
orders from their superiors. To the contrary, they are legally required to
disobey orders that are “patently” or “manifestly” illegal. 134 Failing to
disobey such orders can result in criminal sanctions. 135 This rule has a long
historical pedigree dating to the military law of ancient Rome; it is also
reflected in the Nuremberg Tribunal Charter’s declaration that action
“pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from
responsibility.” 136 In other words, military subordinates must obey orders
unless doing so would clearly violate the law.
Military courts and observers have attempted to flesh out the standard
in a number of ways. One observer, for example, describes clearly illegal
orders as those that do not require “situational judgment.” 137 Such orders, in
131. See, e.g., Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118 (2016)
(reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)).
132. See Mark J. Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War,
86 CALIF. L. REV. 939 (1998).
133. In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153 (1890).
134. See CHRISTOPHER FONZONE, WHAT THE MILITARY LAW OF OBEDIENCE DOES (AND DOESN’T)
DO (Mar. 2018), https://www.acslaw.org/issue_brief/briefs-landing/what-the-military-law-of-obediencedoes-and-doesnt-do/ [https://perma.cc/9Q8T-JGV5].
135. Id. at 7.
136. Id. at 6 (citations omitted); Petty, supra note 4, at 103.
137. See Osiel, supra note 132, at 971.
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other words, are illegal regardless of the given circumstances. 138 Others call
such orders illegal “on their face,” leaving no need to “reason why” the order
is unlawful. 139 This clarity requirement attempts to strike a balance: on the
one hand, it recognizes that the need for military discipline is not absolute;
after all, national security itself can be served by respecting the supremacy
of law. 140 On the other hand, the clarity requirement also recognizes that
legal supremacy is also not absolute; the rule thus forgives illegal behavior
that is minor or that seemed legal at the time and therefore not “clearly”
illegal. 141
Examples of orders found to be clearly illegal may help to illustrate the
requirement’s narrow scope. Take the famous case involving First
Lieutenant William Calley, who claimed that he was merely following orders
when leading troops to kill innocent civilians in the Vietnamese village of
My Lai. 142 Calley argued that the trial judge had applied too high a standard
in instructing the jury to ask “whether a man of ordinary sense and
understanding” would know that the order was unlawful under the
circumstances. Calley instead sought a more forgiving standard, which the
court rejected. 143 In upholding the guilty verdict, the U.S. Court of Military
Appeals declared: “An order to kill infants and unarmed civilians who were
so demonstrably incapable of resistance to the armed might of a military
force” was “so palpably illegal” that the standard applied did not matter.
Other cases involving “clearly” illegal orders similarly feature demands to
shoot individuals, including a wounded trespasser and a prisoner. 144
While illegality by executive officials is unlikely to present such
extreme scenarios, clearly unlawful orders may also be a compelling basis
for civil servant disobedience. 145 Legal supremacy is a central bureaucratic
value, as Weber recognized years ago. 146 While the military context often
invokes the international laws of war, 147 the case for bureaucratic defiance is
likely strongest when the executive branch defies a legal conclusion reached
138. Id.
139. FONZONE, supra note 134, at 9.
140. Id. at 8.
141. Id.
142. See United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973); Petty, supra note 4, at 104.
143. Calley, 48 C.M.R. at 22.
144. United States v. Kinder, 14 C.M.R. 742, 750 (A.F.B.R. 1954); United States v. Griffen,
39 C.M.R. 586 (A.B.R. 1968). These two cases are discussed and cited in FONZONE, supra note 134, at
9.
145. See Ingber, supra note 4, at 203–04.
146. See WEBER ET AL., supra note 84.
147. FONZONE, supra note 134, at 9; Osiel, supra note 132.
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with finality by the Supreme Court. 148 The harder cases arise when the
Supreme Court has not yet adjudicated the precise legal question, or when
there is still disagreement among lower courts. Indeed, government lawyers
have long struggled with identifying the “client” to whom ethical duties are
owed: her agency, the executive branch, courts or the public. 149
It is tempting here to draw from the context of qualified immunity, in
which a government official is subject to liability if found violating a “clearly
established” law. 150 As many have noted, this inquiry is remarkably difficult
to render precise. 151 The Supreme Court, however, has stated that a clear law
does not require “a case directly on point,” but “existing precedent must have
placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” 152 In addition,
the law cannot “be defined at a high level of generality,” but rather “must be
particularized to the facts of the case.” 153 Perhaps these efforts to define
“clearly established” law can provide some traction for determining when an
executive official has violated such a law, in which case civil servant
disobedience is more likely to be justified. 154 Some have also promisingly
148. Cox, supra note 32.
149. The norm expressed in model rules seems to suggest the government lawyer’s primary duty is
to her immediate agency head. See White, supra note 101. See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
r. 1.13(a) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2016) (“A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the
organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.”). When agency officials are “clearly” acting
in violation of law, however, the rules seem to contemplate elevation to higher level officials and
eventually the public. Specifically, the ethical rules contemplate situations when a government lawyer
“knows” that her client is “engaged in action” that is “a violation of law . . . likely to result in substantial
injury to the organization.” Id. at 1.13(b). Under those circumstances, the lawyer may “refer the matter
to higher authority in the organization” if doing so is in the best interests of the organization. Id. Should
the higher authority fail to respond in a “timely and appropriate” matter, the lawyer may then “reveal
information relating to the representation” if doing so will prevent “substantial injury” to the agency.” Id.
at 1.13(c). In other words, the model rules appear to encourage public disclosure of a client’s illegal acts.
The problem of civil servant disobedience, however, arises when precisely in the areas when the law is
not “clear.”
150. There, the relevant inquiry is whether it would be “clear to a reasonable official that his or her
conduct was unlawful in the situation he or she confronted.” See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). It
is also worth considering the ways in which other “clarity doctrines” operate, such as in the context of
applying Chevron, avoidance, lenity, and the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. See Richard
M. Re, Clarity Doctrines, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3327038 [https://perma.cc/6CVZ-ZNX3] (arguing that “the goals of any given
clarity doctrine should and often do dictate the form of clarity sought under that doctrine”).
151. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1797, 1814 (2018) (describing the Supreme Court’s vacillation in defining what constitutes a “clearly
established” law); Michael S. Catlett, Clearly Not Established: Decisional Law And The Qualified
Immunity Doctrine, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 1031, 1041 (2005) (noting the Supreme Court’s failure to articulate
consistent guidelines for lower courts engaged in qualified immunity analysis).
152. Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018).
153. White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017).
154. It is possible that the bureaucratic context could require less clarity in principle than in the
military arena due to the different tradeoffs involved.
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suggested that the doctrine may encourage parties to seek and rely on expert
legal opinions. 155 Indeed, the more that civil servants seek out legal opinions
from inside and outside the executive branch before taking matters into their
hands, the less likely it is for unjustified disobedience to occur.
That said, focusing solely on legalism threatens to drain the moral
resonance of civil disobedience more generally. 156 Legalism reduces the
convictions of civil disobedience to a thin account of rule-following. 157 It
also fails to address what William Simon has called the “nightmarish
slippery slope” of legal positivism, which blesses “compliance with
jurisdictionally adequate but morally evil laws like the Nazi enactments
requiring reporting Jews.” 158 The issue is whether there is also a legitimate
basis for bureaucrats to disobey morally repugnant edicts from superiors,
even if they comply with duly-passed laws. 159
While a full treatment of this nuanced question will not be attempted
here, a few observations may be relevant. 160 First, to the extent
disagreements about morality can be understood in terms of conflicting
comprehensive doctrines, 161 the potential for irreducible intra-agency
conflict is high. Moral conflicts understood as such threaten order and
stability—even more so than legal disputes where authoritative institutions
exist to settle them. Civil servant disobedience on this basis is thus perilous.
If immorality, however, is instead understood as violations of universal

155. Re, supra note 150, at 31 (citing Edward C. Dawson, Qualified Immunity for Officers’
Reasonable Reliance on Lawyers’ Advice, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 525 (2016)).
156. See Zashin, supra note 33, at 297–300.
157. Id. at 287 (citing JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM (1964)).
158. William H. Simon, Should Lawyers Obey the Law?, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 217, 224 (1996).
159. While referencing the positivist view, this discussion acknowledges that the “separability” of
law and morality has been a long-running debate between positivists and natural law theorists in
jurisprudence. See, e.g., AUGUSTINE, ON FREE CHOICE OF THE WILL 8 (Thomas Williams trans., Hackett
Publ’g Co. 1993) (“[A]n unjust law is no law at all.”); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—a
Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed.
1994) (1961); Jules L. Coleman, The Architecture of Jurisprudence, 121 YALE L.J. 2, 5 (2011); H.L.A.
Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1957).
160. A more sophisticated treatment could grapple with a number of rich philosophical and
jurisprudential debates these questions implicate. See, e.g., Philippe Nonet, What Is Positive Law?,
100 YALE L.J. 667, 669 (1990); Connie S. Rosati, Is There A “Higher Law”? Does It Matter?, 36 PEPP.
L. REV. 615, 617 (2009).
161. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); Charles A. Kelbley, Are There Limits to
Constitutional Change? Rawls on Comprehensive Doctrines, Unconstitutional Amendments, and the
Basis of Equality, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1487, 1491–92 (2004) (“Rawls’s political conception of justice
necessarily distances itself from comprehensive doctrines. These doctrines, of a religious, moral, or
philosophical nature, are more or less comprehensive insofar as they embrace positions on all values, or
at least on a wide spectrum of values. Various religions, philosophies, and moral theories are standard
examples of comprehensive doctrines.”).
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shared values, 162 then disobedience of immoral orders may be better
justified. When conceptions of morality are widely known and held,
bureaucratic disobedience may be warranted and also less prone to error and
distraction. Note that this approach is similar to an account based on clear
illegality: both are grounded in duly recognized breaches of moral or legal
norms.
III. IMPLICATIONS
This Part now considers an alternative to civil servant disobedience—
resignation—as well as the potential impacts of the social practice on the
administrative state more broadly.
A. The Exit Objection
Perhaps the strongest objection to civil servant disobedience is that civil
servants, unlike private citizens, can and should exit the objectionable entity.
Resigning, in this view, allows accountable actors to maintain control and is
less disruptive to the workplace than disobedience. Resigning is the only
legitimate way for civil servants to resist, lest the unitary executive be
compromised and managerial chaos ensue. While this argument undoubtedly
has force, a closer examination suggests a more complicated assessment. 163
First, consider that civil servants are required to take oaths not to the
President, but rather to support and defend the Constitution. 164 Witnessing
unconstitutional directives and then resigning—knowing that one’s
replacement would simply carry them out—could be understood as a
violation of one’s constitutional fidelity. Second, Congress’ numerous
whistleblower statutes suggests the legislative desire to protect disclosures,
rather than encourage withdrawals. These statutes explicitly prohibit adverse
personnel actions “for refusing to obey an order that would require the

162. Cf. Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 400, 414
(1984) (observing shared “virtues” found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights); JACK
DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2013).
163. See JENNET KIRKPATRICK, THE VIRTUES OF EXIT: ON RESISTANCE AND QUITTING POLITICS
(2017).
164. 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2012) (“An individual, except the President, elected or appointed to an office
of honor or profit in the civil service or uniformed services, shall take the following oath: ‘I, AB, do
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all
enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this
obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully
discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.’ This section does not
affect other oaths required by law.”).
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individual to violate a law.” 165 In other words, Congress has sought to
encourage, rather than discourage, disobedience despite the potential costs
to agency management.
Insofar as the interests of agency managers are at stake, resignations can
also be just as disorderly, if not more so, than defiance. Jennet Kirkpatrick,
for instance, discusses numerous species of exits from political
organizations. Exits, especially when they are en masse can be “expressive”
exits: the departures alone are communicative acts that can depress agency
morale.166 Exits can also be “resistant,” that is, “the person or group” can use
“the departure or the safety that it affords to oppose dominant power
relations” within the organization from the “outside.” 167 Resistant exits can
thus result in more disruption to the organization in the longer term.
Finally, it is also worth noting that resignation is not as costless to civil
servants, as it might be to political appointees. Because many civil servants
entered government service expecting to build their careers there, they may
lack the networks and resources to be able to transition easily into new
positions. As a result, they might not have as many alternate employment
options as the revolving door narrative may otherwise suggest. For all these
reasons, the case for resignation is mixed, especially when balanced against
the threat of illegal governmental coercion.
B. Backlash
Public resistance of the kind exemplified by civil servant disobedience
has its merits, among them transparency and the opportunity for political
contestation. As Bijal Shah rightly emphasizes, the phenomenon can also
raise important “fire alarms” inviting greater legislative and judicial
oversight. 168 In other words, civil servant disobedience can signal the
presence of illegal behavior that may have otherwise gone unchecked. But
civil servant disobedience also has other consequences, some unintended. 169
One is the inevitable crackdown from above. As David Hume observed,
165. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(D) (2012). See JON O. SHIMABUKURO & L. PAIGE WHITAKER,
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS UNDER FEDERAL LAW: AN OVERVIEW (Sept. 2012), https://fas.org/sgp/
crs/misc/R42727.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3XD-UWFY].
166. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 163, at 18–19.
167. Id. at 20.
168. Bijal Shah, Civil Servant Dissonance & Alarm, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. (forthcoming 2019)
(manuscript at 21–23) (on file with author).
169. Relatedly, there are also potential unintended consequences of analyzing the phenomenon of
civil servant disobedience at all. Doing so explicitly may invite more ill-considered and unjustified
attempts to resist executive orders than would have otherwise occurred. I thank Jeremy Rabkin for
pressing this point.
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“where a disposition to rebellion appears among any people, it is one chief
cause of tyranny in the rulers, and forces them into many violent measures
which they never would have embraced.” 170 In other words, overt uprisings
can stoke even stronger authoritarian impulses.
Consider the following actions by the Trump Administration thus far:
•

President Trump signed the Department of Veterans Affairs
Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act. 171 The act erodes the
due process safeguards of all VA employees by decreasing the time
staffers have to respond to adverse actions such as suspensions,
demotions, and firings to seven business days. The Act also lowers the
burden of proof required for management allegations against
employees (from a “preponderance of evidence” to “substantial
evidence”). 172

•

In May 2018, Trump issued three executive orders concerning the civil
service. The Executive Order Promoting Accountability and
Streamlining Removal Procedures Consistent with Merit System
Principles, for example, expedites the process of firing and disciplining
federal employees. 173

Reflecting on this state of affairs, one worries about the longer term
consequences of civil servant disobedience and its inevitable presidential
backlash. The potential for mutually respectful, reciprocal progress is instead
being squandered for mutually assured destruction to the long-cultivated
norms of professionalism that have defined the civil service. 174 To be sure,
destruction is what President Trump has confessed to want. But the
institution of the presidency also stands to be weakened in the long term.
170. DAVID HUME, THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF DAVID HUME 519 (1854).
171. Pub. L. No. 115-41, 132 Stat. 862 (codified in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.). See also Joe
Davidson, New VA Law sets stage for government-wide cut in civil-service protections, WASH. POST
(June 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/06/21/new-va-law-setsstage-for-government-wide-cut-in-civil-service-protections/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.54923c4581f0
[https://perma.cc/KA9B-JT9Q].
172. Id.
173. Exec. Order No. 13,839, 83 Fed. Reg. 25,343 (May 25, 2018). Now, performance is considered
above seniority in determining who to retain during reduction in force (RIF) layoffs, poor performers and
those accused of misconduct are now allotted only a thirty day grace period for improvement (in contrast
to a prior grace period of up to 120 days). Agencies are also permitted to consider all of an employee’s
past misconduct and not just similar past misconduct when conducting disciplinary action.
174. See WILLIAM G. RESH, RETHINKING THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY: TRUST,
INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL, AND APPOINTEE-CAREERIST RELATIONS IN THE GEORGE W. BUSH
ADMINISTRATION (2015) (arguing that mutual support based on optimistic trust is a more effective
managerial strategy than fragmentation).
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Policies that the president favors will not be as informed nor as effectively
executed as they otherwise could have been. Going forward, there will thus
be an important need to rebuild trust between the bureaucracy and its
political superiors.
CONCLUSION
Civil servant disobedience has been a notable feature of the
administrative state under the Trump Administration. The bureaucracy has
been openly challenging decisions made by its political appointees. This
article has sought to isolate the phenomenon conceptually and begin an
exploration into its normative implications. One of its contributions has been
to consider an ideal of bureaucratic process—the reciprocal hierarchy—that
may help to inform evaluations of the phenomenon alongside other criteria.
Considered together, these factors likely suggest that the practice is difficult
to justify.
Much work on the topic remains. While this exploration has searched
for guiding normative principles, it has not addressed the question of which
institution should authoritatively settle disputes about their application.
When there are reasonable disagreements about whether the reciprocal
hierarchy has been violated, for example, who should resolve them—a judge,
Congress, members of civil society, others? Another important question
going forward is the extent to which norm violations by the President or his
appointees warrant norm violations by those serving them. Overt
bureaucratic resistance also captures only a small fraction of pushback by
bureaucrats, which is more often covert and anonymous. In this sense, this
work can be fairly criticized for sacrificing scope for timeliness. Covert
resistance requires its own sustained evaluation, as well as comparison with
other forms of defiance such as conscientious objection, leaking and uncivil
obedience.
Bureaucratic resistance, broadly defined, is neither exceptional nor
unprecedented. Even the most ardent proponents of executive power may
have to acknowledge that some forms of it are inevitable in hierarchies with
imperfect information. Like civil disobedience by private citizens, civil
servant disobedience raises difficult questions about how to resolve the rule
of law with competing values like managerial efficiency. Debates about the
phenomenon will inevitably continue to be informed by contemporary
dynamics; indeed, the Trump Administration, more than most presidencies,
has highlighted how the ideal of the unitary executive can falter in practice.
Whether the administrative state stands to be strengthened or weakened as a
result remains to be seen.

